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Book Reviews
THE END OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW?
ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE. By Louis
Michael Seidman.1 New York, N.Y.: Oxford University
Press. 2013. Pp. xii + 162. $21.95.
Adam Shinar 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Displeasure with constitutional law has been a fixture in
American constitutional scholarship probably for as long as
constitutional law has been around. Yet in the main, scholars
have worked within the confines of the enterprise itself, trying to
show how particular judicial decisions were unwise, rested on
faulty logic, or were unsupported given the writer’s preferred
mode of interpretive methodology. Mainstream constitutional
theory also accepted the premises of constitutionalism.
Foundational works did not question the desirability of having a
constitution or dispute the courts’ power of judicial review of
legislation, but rather sought to justify it. Different as they are,
3
Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch, Ely’s Democracy and
4
5
Distrust, Tribe’s American Constitutional Law, or Ackerman’s
6
We the People, broadly stand for the idea that although
constitutionalism and judicial review may seem problematic
from a democratic standpoint, they can nevertheless be
vindicated in one way or another. And moreover, that the
1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University
Law Center.
2. Assistant Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center,
Herzliya. Thanks to Anna Su and Mark Tushnet for helpful comments and suggestions.
3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
4. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
5. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
6. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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American constitutional project, as it has developed over the
years, is one worth preserving.
In recent decades, however, this approach has begun to
unravel. Armed with the political insights of American legal
realism and critical legal studies, the internal critique of Supreme
Court decisions, while still the bread and butter of constitutional
scholarship, has been supplemented by new avenues of
constitutional theorizing. The problem for the new wave of
constitutional scholarship did not (or not always) lie with faulty
judicial reasoning, internal contradictions, or morally troublesome court decisions, but with a deep skepticism about the
constitutional project as a whole. Weary of deploying the usual
moves against decisions they believed to be mistaken, scholars
went after the institutions that produced them, namely, the
Supreme Court. The calls to end or reform judicial review grew
out of an exasperation over the way constitutional law was
made, the institutions in charge of its development, and what
scholars believed was the harmful effect of judicial review on the
7
political branches and on the political culture.
The most important intellectual movement to emerge from
this, Popular Constitutionalism, spearheaded the call to “Take the
Constitution away from the Courts,” or to significantly cut back on
the power of judicial review. Popular and progressive
constitutionalists, under various stripes, sought to shift the task of
constitutional interpretation from the Supreme Court to Congress,
to the Executive, to states, to lower courts, to social movements,
8
and to the people at large. Instead of focusing exclusively on the
first order level of desirable or undesirable decisions, popular
constitutionalists turned to interrogate the second order level of the
political institutions that generate those decisions.
Despite their break with earlier constitutional theorists,
popular constitutionalists still claimed adherence to the
Constitution, as they sought to reclaim it from courts and return
it to the “people.” The problem, they maintained, was that
courts have monopolized constitutional interpretation. This
7. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
8. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994); Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review:
Popular Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 971 (2010); Robert
Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular
Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010).
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“judicial overhang” leads legislators to abdicate their
constitutional responsibility; having non-elected judges decide
constitutional issues, when those involve subjects of deep
societal conflict, strips the people of their capacity for selfgovernment. Of course, some of these arguments were not new,
but they did crystallize into a more coherent movement that
deployed a shared rhetoric and reasoning.
Popular constitutionalists were not alone. Others, such as
Sanford Levinson and Larry Sabato, called to take stock not just
of judicial review, but of the constitutional design itself. Shifting
the focus from the provisions that spark continued legal and
popular interest to the “hardwired” institutional arrangements
that structure politics, they argued that the Constitution has
democratic deficits, produced unfair results, and generated
political gridlock and a dysfunctional Congress. They urged,
separately, to revise the Constitution in numerous ways, so as to
9
make it more democratic and responsive to popular will.
In their own way, however, both popular constitutionalists
and constitutional revisionists belong to the camp of
constitutional fidelity. Neither questions the need for a
constitution. They remain constitutionalists, although they would
like to see the Constitution or the practice that attends it
transformed. In this sense, the new wave of constitutional theory
is still very much connected to the scholarship that preceded it,
for neither challenges the basic idea of constitutionalism.
On the heels of this debate comes Louis Michael Seidman’s
important and provocative new book, On Constitutional
Disobedience. Unlike other constitutional theorists, Seidman is not
concerned with how best to interpret the Constitution or the role of
the judge. He does not want to revise the Constitution. Instead, he
wants us to ignore it. His two overarching arguments are, first, that
if an all things considered judgment counsels us to prefer a
particular policy, the fact that the Constitution tells us otherwise
should not matter. Second, that by invoking the Constitution we
use language that gets in the way of all things considered decisions.
Thus not only do we not have a political obligation to obey the
Constitution, but constitutional discourse harms our political
conversations by excluding merit-based considerations.
9. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006);
LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION: WHY THE CONSTITUTION MUST
BE REVISED: IDEAS TO INSPIRE A NEW GENERATION (2008).
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In the pages that follow I will present and evaluate
Seidman’s arguments in favor of constitutional disobedience.
While I believe that his core argument about the absence of a
political obligation is sound, I will offer a skeptical rejoinder to
his vision of political life without a constitution. My main
argument is that any political program that wants to do away
with constitutionalism must engage in careful comparative
institutional analysis. In the end, Seidman may be right, but for
his claim to succeed more needs to be said about what
constitutions do and how countries that do not operate under
written constitutions operate.
II. THE CORE OF THE ARGUMENT
The puzzle of constitutional obligation, as Seidman puts it,
is as follows: If we decide on a course of action, why should the
fact that a contrary action is required by an old document have
any power over us? If the right way goes against the
Constitution, should we not choose what is right over what is
written? Seidman’s worry is not only that we are making bad
decisions because of constitutional obedience, but that when
arguments are phrased in constitutional language they
unnecessarily raise the stakes of the argument by excluding
other arguments that are not traceable to the Constitution. This,
Seidman claims, has “poisoned” political discourse.
Seidman’s solution is not to take sides in the prevailing
constitutional debates, which he believes are impossible to
resolve, but to cut the Gordian knot altogether. Only by putting
the Constitution aside, by considering it abstractly, as “a work of
art, designed to evoke a mood or emotion, rather than as a legal
document commanding specific outcomes,” he argues, can we
talk about the merits of policy choices without being
encumbered by the Constitution (p. 8).
Of course, in order for us to get to that place, we need to
disarm ourselves of the mistaken notion that we are bound by
the Constitution. Before we get to that, however, Seidman draws
our attention to an overlooked feature of modern debates in
constitutional theory. Those revolve around two issues. The first
is who should interpret the Constitution. This challenge can be
10
traced to Bickel’s countermajoritarian difficulty, and even
before that, to Thayer’s insistence that courts should refrain
10.

BICKEL, supra note 3, at 15–16.
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from invalidating laws unless in cases of clear mistakes by
11
Congress. The second issue, one which follows from the first, is
how the authoritative interpreter should interpret the
Constitution. These debates, however, bypass the real question:
Why is constitutional obedience warranted in the first place (p.
32)? Everyone assumes that the Constitution is binding and the
only question is who should interpret it and how. But the
problem goes much deeper. Constitutionalism itself is
countermajoritarian. Judicial review is merely a technique for
assuring constitutional obedience, but legislators can act out of
constitutional obedience and flout the will of their constituents
just like judges can ignore majoritarian processes (p. 36). The
problem, then, is with constitutionalism and not the particular
12
devices put in place to carry out its commands.
To substantiate his claim for the absence of an obligation of
constitutional obedience, Seidman examines the prevailing
justifications grounding such an obligation. These can be divided
into three types: arguments from precommitment, time-based
arguments, and arguments from stability. The first two are
theoretical, the third is empirical. While most of the book is
devoted to debunking these justifications, for reasons of space I
will discuss them relatively briefly.
A. REJECTING PRECOMMITMENT
Precommitment strategists argue that constitutions are
desirable because they protect democratic processes from future
potential violations due to misjudgments or human excesses. As
Cass Sunstein argues, precommitment devices are not in tension
with democracy, but rather compatible with democratic self13
government. For example, free speech and voting rights
guarantee that minorities will be heard in the face of hostile
majorities. Similarly, constitutionally entrenching a separation of
powers scheme reduces the likelihood of future power grabs,
14
A constitution removes
while limiting political power.
controversial issues that are likely to get in the way of reasoned
decisionmaking because of their potential to create factionalism,

11. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
12. For a description of these devices see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997).
13. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 637 (1991).
14. Id. at 638.
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instability, collective action problems, or strategic behavior. 15
Precommitment mechanisms, then, although they constrain
political choices, purport to strengthen democracy by taking
certain options off the table and free up resources that can be
16
Now, if
channeled into democratic decisionmaking.
constitutionally entrenched precommitment strategies facilitate
a functioning government that guarantees individual rights, we
may be obligated to obey such a constitution.
This view of precommitment, however, may rest on a faulty
analogy. While one can view it as a means to facilitate
democratic decisionmaking, Seidman argues it is no more than
an intergenerational power grab (p. 40). Obeying a constitution
in virtue of it being a constitution means allowing the considered
judgments at time one to immunize the constitution against the
considered judgment of future generations (p. 52). Consider the
classic metaphor to justify precommitment, that of Ulysses tying
himself to the mast so he can later enjoy the singing of the Sirens
without being drawn to the coast where they would kill him. The
problem is that it was Ulysses who decided to precommit
himself. His decision was made by him and for him. But the
precommitment argument for constitutionalism is different
because those who precommit are not the ones who are later
constrained. These are people from the past who assert power
on people living today. Perhaps there is a way in which we can
tell ourselves a story that the Framers are actually us; that there
is a single, collective, national identity over time that links us and
them in ways that make their decisions our own. But, as will be
explained below, such a story is simply that, a story (p. 42).
To be sure, it is possible that those erstwhile decisions
enhance our freedom. But Seidman finds this argument lacking.
Precommitment works only if the right kinds of decisions have
been made. Not every precommitment mechanism necessarily
enhances freedom, and by entrenching a particular mechanism
we make it more difficult to change if we come to the conclusion
that our freedom is unduly constrained. More importantly, we
have no a priori reason to believe that the precommitment
decision in time one was indeed the correct one. It may very well
be that our decision then was an “all things considered”
judgment, but it was a different generation’s all considered
15.
16.

Id. at 642.
For a classic statement of precommitment as enhancing freedom, see J ON
ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (1984).
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judgment, and it is not clear why past preferences are more
respect worthy than present preferences, especially when those
were “revealed” by people who had no idea what modern life
would look like (p. 49). It is true that we tend to idealize the
Founding generation, but it is a mistake to believe that they were
not susceptible to biases and prejudices that are similar to, if not
17
more severe than, our own.
Of course, we may happen to agree with the decisions
made by the Framers, but in that case our deference to the
past is not the result of obligation, but because we are
persuaded by the content of their decisions (p. 48).
Remember that the test for a duty of constitutional obedience
is that we would comply even if our “all things considered”
judgment would have us go the other way. In cases of
substantive policy agreement we are not motivated by our
duty of constitutional obedience, but by our substantive
agreement with their decisions. Thus we would be free to
follow the constitutional arrangements we agree with, but we
would also have the power to modify those that are no longer
working for us.
Supporters of the precommitment rationale claim that
taking certain options off the table stabilizes society and helps
avert disaster. For example, by protecting questions of
religion from resolution by democratic processes, we cabin an
18
explosive issue that would continually be divisive. But as
Seidman correctly points out, whether disaster will occur is an
empirical question. People who act out of self-interest often
(though not always) converge on compromises all sides can
live with. A constitution may reflect those compromises, but
the compromises are antecedent to a constitution in that those
compromises could have been reached regardless. The choice
between constitutionalism and disaster is therefore a false one
(p. 46). To wit, countries that do not have a written
constitution that constitutes a higher law, for example Britain
or New Zealand, do not explode because they lack disaster
17. In addition to the familiar gender and race based objections to the ratification
process, much historical evidence suggests that the Founding was a period of interest
group politics and that the Founders were partly driven by their desire to secure private
property, political power, and social status. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1935); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787
(1969). For a discussion of the myths surrounding the Founding, see Michael J. Klarman,
The Founding Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544 (2011).
18. Sunstein, supra note 13, at 639.
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aversion precommitment mechanisms in the form of a written
19
constitution.
B. REJECTING TIME-BASED ARGUMENTS
Arguments for constitutional obligation sometimes rest on
the respect we owe the past. For example, one argument for
constitutional obligation is grounded in the supermajorities that
20
ratified it. But, as Seidman argues, in order for supermajorities
to get support from other constituencies they often have to water
down their principles. This may result either in constitutions that
entrench minority interests or, more commonly, in constitutional
provisions that are so vague that everyone can agree on them
(pp. 50–51). Both situations are problematic for a position that
embraces constitutional obedience. Under the first scenario, it is
not clear why we would be obligated to obey a document that
entrenches minoritarian interests. Under the second scenario, if
everyone can find support for their preferred position, the
Constitution is not doing any work that is independent from
antecedent preferences.
A different time-based argument suggests that
constitutional obligation can be derived from what is referred to
as “constitutional moments,” for example those that characterize
periods such as the Founding, Reconstruction, or the New Deal
settlement. As Bruce Ackerman argues, during constitutional
moments the people speak and reveal their true preferences.
These are the times when the people are engaged in
constitutional creation, expressing their permanent convictions
while suspending self-interest. Respecting the decisions that
emanate from those moments is thus truly adhering to the “real”
21
popular will. Accepting this argument also dissolves the tension
between constitutionalism and democracy, for the Constitution
merely reflects the settlements arrived at during constitutional
moments, and, again, those were moments of popular political
engagement, so enforcing the Constitution is simply enforcing
the people’s will.
19. It is a misnomer to suggest that commonwealth countries do not have a
constitution. These countries have organic acts and conventions that function like a
constitution. When Seidman uses the term constitution, I take him to mean a written
constitution, identified as such, that constitutes a higher law, more difficult to change,
which legally constrains ordinary politics.
20. Of course, the ratification process excluded most groups, such as women,
blacks, and non-propertied whites. This in itself significantly weakens the Constitution’s
democratic provenance.
21. ACKERMAN, supra note 6.
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Ackerman’s theory has been criticized extensively, 22 but for
Seidman’s purposes it suffices that many provisions in the
Constitution were not the result of constitutional moments.
More importantly, constitutional moments are never pure selfreflective moments where politics and rent-seeking are
23
suspended. Idealizing these moments is therefore mistaken.
Similar to his argument against precommitment, if the decisions
generated by constitutional moments do not seem wise to us
today on all things considered judgments, it is hard to
understand the pull that a constitutional moment purports to
exert (p. 57).
Finally, Seidman dismantles the argument that the
Framers are us. Psychologically it might make sense to give an
account that connects us to the Founding or to later periods of
constitutional creation, because we need to justify what makes
24
us a unique political community. But even if this story makes
sense as a metaphysical abstraction, even if we somehow see
the United States as one ongoing entity, it does not follow that
what happens in the past binds us today. Of course, we can
make a choice to honor our past commitments, but that is a
choice, not a necessity (p. 58).
C. ARGUMENTS FROM STABILITY
Arguments in favor of an obligation to obey the
Constitution may be grounded in the Constitution’s capacity to
settle disputes. Without an authoritative document that
25
coordinates political activity we run the risk of anarchy.
Underlying this argument is necessarily the assumption that
constitutionalism imposes order, for if we have a constitution,
and yet constitutional violations occur on a routine basis, it
would be hard to make the argument that the Constitution
imposes settlement. At bottom this is an empirical debate, but in

22. See, e.g., Don Herzog, Democratic Credentials, 104 ETHICS 467 (1994); Michael
J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s
Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992).
23. Klarman, supra note 22, at 781–85 (demonstrating that the Founding was rife
with self-interested behavior).
24. For such an account see JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001) (arguing that self-government is
meaningful only if it adheres to our enduring political commitments arrived over time).
25. Larry Alexander & Fredrick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Larry Alexander & Fredrick Schauer,
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455 (2000).
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order to evaluate the validity of such claims we need to have
criteria for assessing constitutional compliance and noncompliance. Here is where things get tricky, Seidman argues,
because we do not, in fact, have a clear idea of what counts as a
constitutional violation.
Given
the
methodological
disagreement
over
constitutional interpretation, someone who ascribes to a
particular approach will always accuse the other of violating
the Constitution. If we think that there is a right answer in
principle, then someone, for example a judge, is often
violating the Constitution according to judges who do not
agree with his methodology. Even when there is
methodological agreement, there will be disagreements over
application. The fact of interpretive disagreement, then, is
evidence that someone is almost always violating the
Constitution according to another approach and yet the
Constitution endures. We live with purported constitutional
violations on a daily basis in central areas of our life, because
someone, some of the time, is accused of violating the
26
Constitution, deliberately or not (p. 64). The point, however,
is that despite constitutional violations the overarching
political framework remains intact.
Finally, Seidman disputes (as many others have) the oftmade claim that constitutionalism better protects freedom.
Drawing on Madison’s image of a constitution as a “parchment
27
barrier,” he argues that freedom is protected only in the
presence of a political culture committed to liberty, one that
values disagreement over obedience. Constitutions may have
freedom protecting provisions, but their ability to deliver is an
empirical matter, because the extent of protection depends on
the particular content of the particular constitution and the way
28
in which it is interpreted and implemented (p. 97). Moreover,
having a system of judicial review does not necessarily improve
rights protection. Courts may wrongly invalidate or uphold
statutes, thus weakening rights, and systems of judicial review
affect the ways in which other political institutions and society
address rights issues, sometimes strengthening the overall level
26. For intentional violations, see Adam Shinar, Dissenting from Within: Why and
How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601 (2013).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28. For an empirical examination of the gap between constitutional text and
practice, see David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV.
863 (2013).
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of rights protection, while at other times weakening it.29
Underlying the empirical difficulty of measurement is the
conceptually prior question of what counts as “freedom
enhancing.” Freedom is an essentially contested concept, and
one would be hard pressed to show why a particular conception
adopted by a court would obligate a person who holds a
30
different conception. Conversely, if one agrees that a court’s
interpretation promotes freedom, one is not following the court,
but his own conviction that he happens to share with the court. It
is the antecedent commitment to freedom that gives rise to the
obligation, not its constitutional inclusion (p. 101).
D. POLITICAL OBLIGATION TO ORDINARY LAWS
In one sense, there is nothing novel about Seidman’s thesis.
Whether there is a general moral obligation to obey the law is a
31
question that has generated a voluminous literature. If there is
32
no moral obligation to obey the law as such, it follows there is
no moral obligation to obey the Constitution, for it is just a
particular legal instrument. Seidman indeed concedes the point,
but maintains that one can forgo constitutional obligation
without giving up on legal obligation to statutes (p. 118).
33
Seidman’s path is similar to the one taken by Joseph Raz.
Although there may not be a moral obligation to obey the law,
there are reasons to obey. Laws serve important coordinative
functions, most of them are not unjust, and there are often
strong prudential reasons to comply (p. 119). Seidman’s contribution is by distinguishing obedience to statutes from
29. For the development of both these claims see Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review
and the Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2002).
30. For the claim that rights are subject to reasonable disagreements, see Jeremy
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). To
demonstrate the claim, think of free speech. On one view, permitting hate speech is in
line with the constitutional free speech guarantee. Yet others believe that hate speech
works to silence the freedom of the groups it is directed against and should therefore be
denied constitutional protection.
31. See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES
OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL
PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979); J.L. Mackie, Obligations to Obey the
Law, 67 VA. L. REV. 143 (1981); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to
Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973).
32. With important exceptions, this seems to be the consensus in the literature. For
exceptions see H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955);
John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3
(Sidney Hook ed., 1964). Rawls’ and Hart’s position has been thoroughly undermined.
See Smith, supra note 31, at 955–60.
33. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 233 (2d ed. 2009).
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obedience to the Constitution. The reasons that exist for
obedience to statutes do not, he claims, apply to the
Constitution. His argument boils down to this: there are good
reasons to obey the law, because in exchange for compliance we
receive benefits from living in an organized society with a legal
system. But it is not clear, he thinks, that we receive any benefits
from having a constitution. Countries with a constitution or a
system of judicial review are not necessarily better at protecting
individual rights. Similarly, even if obedience to law is desirable
because it preserves the state, it does not follow that the state
will go to pieces without a constitution. His argument that the
United States Constitution is routinely violated makes that
point. His conclusion, then, is that while no state can function
without laws and a legal system, states can and do function
without a constitution (p. 122).
E. WHAT ARE THE STAKES?
Why should we relinquish the notion that we are obligated
to obey the Constitution? Obviously, it is strange to continue
believing such an obligation exists if it cannot be defended. But
Seidman is driving at something deeper, because he believes
fidelity to the Constitution has a destructive impact on political
discourse (p. 120). We can debate policy when we talk for or
against statutes, but once we bring in the Constitution, the
conversation moves to constitutional argument, methods of
constitutional interpretation, and legal doctrine. This limits our
political discourse, because the Constitution adds an unnecessary
layer of language that cloaks the real issues in a way that is not
helpful to resolve the particular question. For example, if we are
considering adopting universal healthcare, we should examine
how such a system might function, engage in a cost-benefit
analysis, and consider arguments about distributive justice. But
instead of doing that, we end up discussing whether Congress
has power under the Commerce Clause to enact such a scheme
or whether mandating that people buy health insurance counts
as regulating interstate economic activity or can be considered a
34
tax under Congress’s spending power. These questions,
however, have very little to do with whether having universal
healthcare is a good idea.
The problem, Seidman argues, goes beyond constitutional
language. Constitutional foundationalism, the idea that the
34.

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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Constitution definitively resolves political debates, shuts down
arguments. “When arguments are put in constitutional terms,
they become absolutist and exclusionary” (p. 141), all the while
excusing constitutionalists from “the obligation to give reasons
for their constitutionalism” (p. 136). If the Constitution is
treated as a source of binding political obligation, it becomes an
axiom rather than a contestable principle among many.
What, then, should we do instead? Seidman’s argument is
that we should embrace the “thin constitution,” the idea that the
Constitution is a site for contestation. The Constitution should
serve as a document enumerating certain general principles, but
those should be understood abstractly, not legally. Presumably,
courts will also stay out of constitutional interpretation and the
Constitution should revert to, for example, the status of the
Declaration of Independence. Although Seidman refrains from
saying so explicitly, his frequent invocation of Britain, New
Zealand, Australia (which has a Constitution but no bill of
rights), and even Israel, as role models for genuine political
discourse, indicate that his preferred model of government is a
parliamentary system, or at the very least a system that rejects
constitutionalism, because it is constitutionalism that stands in
the way of policy-based arguments and all things considered
political decisions.
III. IS CONSTITUTIONALISM THE PROBLEM?
Seidman advances two major claims. The first is that there is
no political obligation to obey the Constitution. The second is
that constitutional obedience results in harms to our political
discourse in a way that prevents us from addressing issues based
on all things considered judgments.
I believe that Seidman’s first argument is sound, though I do
not believe it is particularly novel, even if his treatment probes
35
deeper than most. If a constitution is understood as a legal
instrument, the obligation to obey it is no different from that of
any other law. The fact that it was enacted by supermajorities,
that it may have salutary benefits, or that it somehow connects
us with our forebears, cannot give rise to a moral obligation to
obey. As was suggested earlier, there appears to be a near
35. For iterations expressing similar concerns about constitutional obligation, see John
Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove, Jonathan Riley, Editors’ Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONAL
CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 1, 26 (John Ferejohn et al. eds., 2001). For a
comprehensive treatment arriving at a similar conclusion see GREENE, supra note 31.
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consensus that there is no prima facie moral obligation to obey
36
the law as such. To be sure, some laws do contain moral
obligations, but those exist independently from their legal
entrenchment. Killing is wrong regardless of whether there is a
legal prohibition, and the prohibition adds nothing to the moral
duty not to kill. Similarly, a constitution can contain provisions
that generate a moral obligation to obey, but the obligation
arises because of the content of the norm, not its inclusion in a
written text. Of course, there may be good reasons to obey a
constitution, but at bottom this is an empirical question that
depends on the particular constitutional provision, and the likely
37
consequences of disobedience.
Seidman’s second claim, however, is much more
complicated to substantiate. The argument that constitutional
discourse is exclusionary, absolutist, and prevents a genuine
merit-based debate is an assertion made throughout the book,
without being comprehensively defended. The rest of this essay,
therefore, will try to unpack the argument that constitutional law
is destructive for political debate and for a robust democracy,
and prevents all things considered decisionmaking. My
conclusion is that Seidman casually inserts empirical
assumptions about the workings of non-constitutionalist regimes
that are not necessarily borne out by data. Because his is an
empirical argument, much of it rests on contingent
circumstances, but those play out differently in different
contexts. Sometimes a constitution might have the pernicious
effects Seidman warns us against, but other times a constitution
might achieve the opposite result. Future research should
therefore focus on identifying the conditions that make
constitutionalism more or less conducive to political
decisionmaking. My argument will proceed in three parts.
Firstly, I will briefly discuss the constitutionalism impulse around
the globe as a possible foil for Seidman’s argument that we
should ignore the Constitution. Secondly, I will consider whether
non-constitutionalist regimes do, in fact, facilitate all things
considered political decisions. Finally, I will examine whether
constitutions always negatively impact political discourse.
36. This consensus applies only to the question whether individuals have an
obligation to obey the law. A separate question is whether public officials, judges
included, have such a moral obligation. See JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF
LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING (2010); STEVE SHEPPARD, I DO
SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009).
37. See Steven Shavell, When Is Compliance with the Law Socially Desirable?, 41 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2012).
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A. IF NON-CONSTITUTIONALIST REGIMES ARE SO GREAT,
WHY ARE COUNTRIES GETTING RID OF THEM?
Seidman rejects the idea of constitutional constraints on
ordinary politics, arguing that by ignoring the Constitution we
will arrive at better informed, all things considered, policy
decisions. In making this argument, Seidman frequently
references parliamentary regimes that do not have a written
constitution that imposes legal constraints on politics. But
Seidman gives short shrift to the constitutionalist trend that has
been taking place outside the United States. Indeed, he
overlooks the fact that more and more countries have been
discarding their pure parliamentary and non-constitutionalist
38
regimes in favor of constitutions and judicial review. As Alec
Stone Sweet and Cristina Andersen show in a study from 2008,
190 countries have written constitutions, of which 183 have a bill
of rights. Importantly, of the 114 constitutions written since 1985
(not all of them still in use), at least 106 of them contain a bill of
rights and 101 provide for judicial review of legislation. The only
country to leave out a bill of rights was the 1983 apartheid-era
39
South African Constitution, hardly a ringing endorsement.
Most famously, classical Westminster parliamentary
systems, such as Canada, Britain, New Zealand, and Israel, have
incorporated constitutional elements into their political
institutions. Canada passed a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982, which also significantly expanded judicial review of
legislation. Britain passed the Human Rights Act in 1998, giving
effect to rights contained in the European Convention of Human
Rights, while also enabling “weak form” judicial review of laws
that are incompatible with those rights. New Zealand, though
maintaining its parliamentary system, has passed a bill of rights
law that instructs courts to interpret legislation consistently with
the rights enumerated there. And Israel transformed itself from
a pure parliamentary system to a country with a set of basic laws
that are superior to ordinary legislation, which can now be struck
40
down through judicial review.
This trend is important because it attests to a dissatisfaction
with parliamentary and non-constitutionalist regimes. At the very
38. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
771 (1997).
39. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 84 n.27 (2008).
40. For elaboration, see STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013).
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least it should give Seidman pause and lead him to ask what is
going on. If constitutions obstruct political discourse and
democratic decisionmaking, why are so many countries opting to
transition to such systems? To be sure, many scholars have offered
explanations, ranging from a commitment to human rights,
signaling to other developed countries that they belong in the same
camp, or to attempts by embattled hegemonies to preserve political
41
power that they believe will be lost. Some of these explanations
could fit with Seidman’s argument against constitutionalism, but
the book does not explore this question at all. Thus we remain with
an assertion about the evils of constitutionalism without examining
why alternative regimes, including those favored by Seidman, are in
the process of being phased out all over the world. Of course, all
these countries could be wrong. But Seidman should at least
explain why they are wrong, and why his proposed solution
(ignoring the Constitution) would function better in the U.S. than
in the countries that have tried and experimented with nonconstitutionalist frameworks.
This brings up a related point. Throughout the book, Seidman
treats constitutionalism as a monolithic entity. The main idea is that
we have to get rid of the “legal” (as opposed to the “poetic”)
Constitution, or, when the Constitution does not suit our policy
judgments, simply ignore it. But it is not clear why the choice is
presented so starkly, as a dichotomy. Not only have other countries
adopted forms of constitutionalism that are different than the
American version, but various forms of constitutionalism exist
42
inside the United States. Part of the problem with the federal
Constitution no doubt lies with the hurdles imposed by Article V.
The difficulty of amending the Constitution preserves dysfunctional
governance structures and, as a result, shifts the focus to
constitutional interpretation and the courts. But would relaxing the
amendment procedure respond to Seidman’s concerns?
Constitutions that are easy to amend might facilitate better
decisionmaking because they are less likely to create the absolutist
discourse Seidman warns against, but they may also generate
43
frequent political crises that make governance difficult.
41. See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); Daniel A. Farber, Rights as
Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (2002).
42. See, e.g., JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
(2006); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS
OF GOVERNANCE (2012).
43. In the United States alone, there have been nearly 150 state constitutions that
have been amended roughly 12,000 times, with several constitutions being amended
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Thus, the real question should not be whether to
embrace the Constitution or to ignore it, but rather whether
this particular constitution, with the particular institutional
structures it establishes, serves us well. Are there better
constitutional arrangements that we might consider, or are
all constitutional arrangements, by their nature, so harmful
that only a non-constitutionalist system can generate good
decisionmaking that meets Seidman’s standards? To be clear,
my point is not that amending Article V (or any other
structural change) will put Seidman’s concerns to rest, nor is
it that a different institutional configuration will then give
rise to an obligation to obey, as opposed to providing a good
reason. Seidman may be right in the end, but his conclusion
should be the result of careful consideration of institutional
alternatives, not an unsubstantiated assertion. In the sections
that follow, I begin to explore some of these considerations.
B. DO NON-CONSTITUTIONALIST REGIMES FACILITATE ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED POLITICAL DECISIONS?
In his discussion of alternative political arrangements,
Seidman often invokes parliamentary systems that operate
without a written constitution (or without a constitutional
bill of rights) as examples for countries where political
decisions are not encumbered by constitutional constraints
that in turn drive out merit-based decisions. If we did not
have a constitution, we could address the issues themselves
without being distracted and without each side claiming
monopoly on their position by invoking the Constitution.
While this claim may seem non-falsifiable, I believe that
there are ways to approach this question. In this section I
propose we examine the quality of political debates in
parliamentary systems and some of the structural problems
such systems might generate. A different strategy, one which
will be taken in the next section, tries to gauge the quality of
political debate in the U.S. in areas where the Constitution is
relatively silent.
There have been very few attempts to measure discourse
44
quality in politics, and those have been limited to very small
hundreds of times. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2
(2000); THE NBER/MARYLAND ST. CONST. PROJECT, http://www.stateconstitutions.
umd.edu/index.aspx.
44. Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse
Quality Index, 1 COMP. EUR. POL. 21 (2003).
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case studies that are difficult to generalize. 45 What counts as
46
quality is controversial, and there is no consensus that
deliberative quality and just outcomes are related. One insight
revealed by studies that examine parliamentary debates is that
although discourse quality may make some difference in political
institutions, power politics dominate most contexts. In
representative democracies, the mechanisms to select representatives determine, indirectly, which issues will be raised and
how. Improving discursive quality and mitigating instances of
power politics is thus partly a matter of institutional design, for
47
example, through constitutional devices.
Other studies have sought to compare deliberative quality
48
among different types of legislatures. One study concludes that
presidentialist systems are likely to outperform parliamentary
systems. In the former, the executive is not dependent on
legislative confidence, creating a situation of mutual
independence where legislators have more leeway to act without
undermining governmental stability, whereas in parliamentary
systems government controls parliament and thus needs strong
49
party discipline. In presidentialist systems legislators might
have more ability to transcend party boundaries and be open to
50
discursive change. On the other hand, the need for reelection
45. See, e.g., André Bächtiger et al., Patterns of Parliamentary Discourse: How
‘Deliberative’ are German Legislatives Debates?, 17 GERMAN POL. 270 (2008); Peter
Nugus, Rhetorical Strategies of Political Parties and Organized Movements: Deliberative
Democracy and the Australian Monarchy—Republican Debate, 45 J. SOC. 307 (2009).
46. Most of the studies I examine use the “deliberative quality index” modeled
after Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics. See Steenbergen, supra note 44. The criteria
are: 1) participation, 2) level of justification, the reasons speakers give and the
sophistication, 3) content of the justification (phrased as the common good or narrow
interests), 4) respect toward the group, 5) respect toward demand, 6) respect toward
counterarguments, and 7) is the political process constructive, do speakers submit
alternative proposals or seek mediation. See André Bächtiger & Marco R. Steenbergen,
The Real World of Deliberation: A Comparative Study of Its Favorable Conditions in
Legislatures, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 2004/17, at 12, available at
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/2634/sps2004-17.pdf.
47. Markus Spörndli, Discourse Quality and Political Decisions: An Empirical
Analysis of Debates in the German Conference Committee (Univ. of Bern, Discussion
Paper No. SP IV 2003-101, 2003), available at http://www.bids.unibe.ch/unibe/
rechtswissenschaft/oefre/bids/content/e3446/e3501/iv03-101.pdf.
48. The subsequent discussion assumes that political decisions are affected by
institutional design and that the distinction between parliamentary and presidential
systems matters. This does not mean that parliamentary systems cannot sometimes
operate like presidential systems and vice versa. My discussion presents both systems as
ideal types. See Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 57
AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2009).
49. Bächtiger& Steenbergen, supra note 46, at 8.
50. Id.
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may undercut this deliberative freedom, bringing it closer to that
of parliamentary systems, since representatives are dependent
on party support for future campaigns. Of course, the quality of
deliberation also depends on the particular issue. Polarizing
issues, the ones Seidman may be referring to, are likely to
generate deliberation of lesser quality, whereas low polarization
51
issues are likely to facilitate better deliberation. An empirical
examination taking these considerations into account, comparing
the U.S. presidentialist system to the United Kingdom’s and
Germany’s parliamentary system revealed, for example, that
legislators in the U.S. display more respect toward the
opposition, though parliaments offer more sophisticated
52
justifications for their policies. The usage of constitutional
language, however, was not clear. The little data we have
suggests that Seidman’s empirical argument is difficult to
evaluate.
Parliamentary systems also differ from other political
systems in the way government exercises power. In
parliamentary systems one party (or a coalition of parties)
controls both the legislature and the executive. The executive
controls the legislative process, and in fact has a de facto
monopoly over the introduction of legislation. This may make
53
parliamentary systems more efficient, but the upshot is that the
majority has an easier time ignoring the opposition and will
consequently be less likely to search for common solutions or
genuine consensus. Respect and persuasion will likely also be
54
lower compared with a system with more veto points. Higher
levels of discourse are more likely to occur when the government
needs at least some support from the opposition. It is to be
expected, then, that in these situations there will be less appeal
to “absolutist, exclusionary” language. Indeed, why would all
things considered decisions be made if one’s majority is already
guaranteed? True, inclusive political discussion can take place in
other venues, for example in the press, the street and in
academia, but then can we really say that such discourse does
51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. at 17. The research looked at debates in the 1980s and 1990s. It is possible
the political culture was less toxic then, which strengthens my argument that the
constitutional design plays a limited role.
53. But see Albert, supra note 48, at 564–73 (discussing unstable minority and
coalition governments).
54. On the importance of veto players in political systems see George Tsebelis,
Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,
Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289 (1995).
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not take place, and at just as high a level, in countries that have a
constitution?
Non-constitutionalist parliamentary systems introduce other
problems that are less likely to occur in systems of divided
political power with constitutional judicial review. In multiparty
parliamentary systems, the largest party will often not have
exclusive control of parliament. It will need to build coalitions
with other parties. In exchange for joining what will usually be
the largest party, the smaller parties will exact a price. This may
lead to situations where certain issues are not debated at all
because they are off the table. Crucially, having an enforceable
constitution may alleviate some of the blockages in political
discourse.
To illustrate, consider two examples from Israel, a country
with a parliamentary system that until relatively recently was not
55
considered to have a constitution. The first example is military
service for ultraorthodox Jews. Israel has mandatory
conscription for its Jewish population, but since its founding
ultraorthodox Jews have been exempt. Initially the number of
exemptions was small, but over time it grew to levels that were
believed to be unsustainable, but more importantly, unfair, by
the majority population that did serve. The problem was that
ultraorthodox parties figured into almost all government
coalitions. As a condition for their support, they insisted on
maintaining the status quo. No matter how much the Israeli
public was disgruntled, the political channels were blocked.
Consequently, individuals turned to litigation to try and force
the government to address the matter. After several failed
attempts, petitioners constitutionalized their claims, grounding
them both in structural arguments and equality based
56
arguments. Those were more successful, and in several cases
the Supreme Court struck down the arrangements obtaining to
exemption of ultraorthodox Jews. Since then, the issue has
become one of the most important and discussed issues in Israeli
politics, with the government currently trying to enact a new
plan for recruitment. It is unclear whether such a plan will
55. For a discussion of Israel’s constitutional revolution, see Gidon Sapir, The
Israeli Constitutional Revolution—How did it Happen?, (Bar-Ilan University Public Law
and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1082230.
56. HCJ 910/86 Resler v. Minister of Defence, 42(2) PD 441 [1988] (Isr.); HCJ
3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence, 52(5) PD 481 [1998] (Isr.); HCJ 6298/07
Resler v. Minister of Defence [2012] (Isr.) (unpublished).
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emerge and whether it would be struck down as well. Should
that happen, Seidman will be right to argue that a constitution
can become a roadblock to further deliberation, but the point is
that without constitutional review the issue would have likely
remained blocked by the regular political channels because of
Israel’s parliamentary structure. Going to the Supreme Court,
raising the stakes, and constitutionalizing the claims, forced the
political branches to debate the issue and make decisions that
otherwise would likely not have been made. Though it is too
early to tell, this may be a case of constitutionalism improving,
not degrading, political decisionmaking.
The second example is the political status of Palestinian
citizens of Israel. Palestinian citizens can vote and be elected to
Israel’s parliament, and most of them run in what are called
“Arab parties.” Those parties do gain seats, but no Arab party
has ever been a member of any Israeli governmental coalition.
Thus the problem is that for the most part, Palestinian citizens
have very little say in the laws governing them.
A partial remedy to the lack of representation and
discrimination has been constitutional judicial review of laws and
57
policies that discriminate against Palestinian citizens. Recall
that Seidman argues that constitutionalism unnecessarily raises
the stakes of the debate and leads to absolutist language that
excludes viewpoints and prevents merit-based policy judgments.
But what if the political system is designed in such a way, or the
political culture operates in such a way, that particular
viewpoints and persons never get to enter the debate in the first
place? If one thinks that ordinary political channels are captured
by lobbies, or if particular groups do not have a say in the
democratic process, then non-constitutionalist parliamentary
regimes might exacerbate such tendencies. Of course, Seidman
may reply that in such cases not having a constitution makes
things easier because we can more easily change a nonfunctioning system. But what would be the majority’s incentive
to change a system that essentially works in its favor?
Constitutionalism, then, has the potential to open up multiple
avenues of discourse (legal and political), which in turn can
expand the parameters of politics, broadly understood.

57. The issue of Palestinians under occupation is more complicated, and the
Supreme Court’s record is much more controversial in that arena. For a critical overview,
see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (2002).
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My point is that the division of political power, a central
feature of most constitutionalist regimes, can work as a bulwark
against the political corruption generated by the concentration
of power in parliamentary systems. Perhaps Seidman would
respond that such problems do not arise in the United States, but
then the question would be, is he right? And if so, did
constitutionalism play an historical role in his being right?
I do not want to press this point too much. Seidman is not
exactly suggesting that we transition to a Westminster style
58
system. What he really means to say is that we should operate
without formally written constitutional constraints, similar to the
workings of Westminster type systems. But there are two
problems with such a claim. First, Westminster systems do
operate with a set of constraints, written laws and unwritten
constitutional conventions that effectively operate like a
constitution in that changing these deeply embedded norms is
59
extremely difficult. Second, non-constitutionalist systems have
their own problems that affect how political debate is conducted,
with the result that some decisions will not be made after an all
things considered process. Idealizing such systems is therefore a
mistake.
C. DO CONSTITUTIONS ALWAYS NEGATIVELY IMPACT
POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND DECISIONMAKING?
Understandably, Seidman does not spend too much time on
comparative institutional analysis. His claim is philosophical, but
mostly it is grounded in American constitutional experience,
albeit only the federal constitutional experience. It would
therefore be valuable to examine policy debates in areas in
which the federal Constitution is silent or not litigated. If
constitutionalism has a pervasively corrosive effect on political
decisionmaking, we might expect that in non-constitutional
domains political discourse will be of higher quality and not be
infected by constitutional pathologies.
To evaluate the corrosiveness of constitutional discourse,
we must first consider the scope of Seidman’s claim. Suppose, for
58. For an evaluation of such a suggestion, see Richard L. Hasen, Political
Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 86 DRAKE L. REV. 989 (2013) (arguing that
tinkering with the constitutional design is risky and suggesting that the current crisis
might self-correct as voters reject party positions that stray too far from the median
voter).
59. See generally ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959).
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example, that the Constitution affects only a small percentage of
political activity and public policy. In that case, although
Seidman’s concerns would be valid, they would not trouble us all
that much. Seidman’s argument becomes more important as the
scope of political activity that arises under the Constitution
grows. To be sure, all political activity arises under the
Constitution, because it takes place under institutional structures
60
the Constitution sets up. Seidman, however, focuses on
61
constitutional language rather than institutional structures. It is
thus important to distinguish his argument from the arguments
that abound about how the constitutional design contributes to
62
the dysfunctional political system. Although it is true that
63
institutional design affects the way politicians make claims, that
linkage is not made explicit in the book.
How much political activity is actually affected by
Seidman’s argument? Here too the answer is elusive, but my
sense is that constitutional scholars, unsurprisingly, exaggerate
the importance of the Constitution and constitutional law. Let us
assume that Supreme Court decisions on constitutional matters
dovetail with the types of concerns made by Seidman. But as
Frederick Schauer, drawing on extensive polling data, showed in
2006, many issues that engage the public and government never
make it to courts, and when they are publicly discussed the
64
Constitution is usually not invoked. Standard debates about the
economy, social security, pensions, foreign affairs, the federal
budget, education, poverty, taxes, the environment, healthcare,
welfare, fuel prices, wars, employment, energy, and defense
spending, just to name a few, are rarely phrased and argued in
65
constitutional terms. True, the Constitution does play a role in
some of these debates, but usually an indirect one, and it is not
clear whether that role leads to the results Seidman warns
60. MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS (2010).
61. Though of course his claim about constitutional obedience applies to
institutional structures as well.
62. LEVINSON, supra note 9; THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S
EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); Symposium, The U.S.
Constitution and Political Dysfunction: Is There a Connection?, 86 DRAKE L. REV. 937
(2013).
63. See generally GARY MUCCIARONI & PAUL J. QUIRK, DELIBERATIVE CHOICES:
DEBATING PUBLIC POLICY IN CONGRESS (2006).
64. Frederick Schauer, Forward: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (2006).
65. Healthcare is a very recent exception, and even then the discussion was about
two (central) provisions of an entire bill. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012).
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against. 66 Of course, even if the Court does decide to take up a
hotly contested issue, that in itself does not necessarily lead to
the denigration of political discourse. Courts often decide
constitutional cases only to conclude that the political branches
are owed broad deference and remand the matter to be argued
elsewhere, often in non-constitutional language.
Seidman, I anticipate, would probably say this is beside
the point. The Court does decide some issues, some of them
are extremely important, and there is no reason for these
issues to be beyond the reach of ordinary politics. We are thus
left, again, with a question of comparative analysis: Is the
political decisionmaking process in areas that are not
dominated by constitutional considerations better than in the
areas where constitutional discourse is regularly invoked by
all sides?
Much like the claim about parliamentary regimes that do
not have a written constitution that constrains ordinary
lawmaking, I believe that any answer is contingent and context
dependent. I leave it to the reader to decide the quality of
American political decisionmaking in areas not dominated by
constitutional considerations. Several points, however, are worth
mentioning. For starters, there is relatively little research about
actual political deliberation. Most theorists have ideas about
what deliberation should look like, whereas empirically oriented
67
research tends to focus on deliberation’s effects. Secondly,
those who have studied deliberation in political settings are not
as sanguine as Seidman about the possibility of merit-based all
things considered decisions, with or without the Constitution.
Obstacles to optimal deliberation include, among others,
unequal deliberative capacities, varying motivations among
participants, and information asymmetries. Even if these
problems are overcome, the deliberative process takes place in
institutional structures that are populated by elected officials,
bureaucrats, and interest groups, all of whom have personal,
ideological, economic, and institutional preferences that are not
necessarily aligned with the substantive merits of the issue in
68
question.
66. Schauer, supra note 64, at 49 (arguing that the Court is only indirectly involved
in the nation’s policy decisions).
67. See David M. Ryfe, Does Deliberative Democracy Work?, 8 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 49, 54 (2005). The literature on public choice makes a similar point.
68. For a detailed discussion of congressional deliberation and its pitfalls, see
MUCCIARONI & QUIRK, supra note 63.
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Consider the political activity that takes place in Congress.
Seidman argues that constitutional language is a conversation
stopper because constitutional claims stem from first principles
that are usually not open to reasoned debate. Yet the use of nonfalsifiable language is not confined to constitutional talk. For
example, research that examined 72 congressional committee
hearings on Medicare, an area when the Constitution is not
usually invoked, concluded that participants offer falsifiable
rationales when the issue is only moderately contentious. The
more contentious the issue becomes, the more participants shift
to non-falsifiable rationales. When the debate shifts to
irreconcilable value conflicts, “participants may expect others to
filter out information that is inconsistent with their priors. . .
With strong disagreement over values and ideological beliefs,
debate participants often cannot hope to modify their
69
opponents’ views of the policy choice.” Similar results have
70
been found elsewhere.
This suggests that the problem is disagreement, not
constitutional language. The use of non-falsifiable language
is but a symptom of a larger problem. Eliminating the
Constitution does not get rid of disagreement. Speakers will
simply revert to other non-falsifiable or contentious
rationales (morals, religion, ideology) that are just as likely
to be exclusivist or absolutist as constitutional discourse.
When it comes to the most contentious issues, what gets in
the way of resolution is not simply the language that we use,
but the fact that these issues are really divisive and subject to
reasonable disagreements. Of course we can eliminate
constitutional language, but these disagreements will then be
mediated by different terms which are likely to be just as
unbridgeable.
In addition to the use of absolutist language, there is the
phenomenon of “one party lawmaking.” For example,
legislators have ways to avoid debating issues altogether by
bypassing committee deliberations so as to limit the influence
of their partisan rivals. Committee chairs have occasionally
shut down hearings to stop minority-invited witnesses from
testifying and prevented minority party members from reading
69. Kevin M. Esterling, “Deliberative Disagreement” in U.S. Health Policy
Committee Hearings, 36 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 169, 171 (2011) (citations omitted).
70. MUCCIARONI & QUIRK, supra note 63, at 14 (finding that welfare reform
debates in Congress became less informative as “election time drew near” and “as the
level of partisanship rose”).
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legislation. 71 Majority leaders have at times excluded committees
from the legislative process, giving the job to ad hoc task forces
72
instead. Both parties, when in the majority, have placed
restrictive rules on many bills to prevent floor amendments from
73
being made and debated. As William Bendix concludes, one
party lawmaking is attributable to increasing partisan
polarization and electoral competition. One party control of
legislation is more pronounced when the majority feels
threatened or when the majority’s policy goals face significant
opposition. Unsurprisingly, restriction of debate occurs more in
bills that reflect the majority party’s “brand,” for example in
taxation and morals legislation. In these areas the majority party
has fixed preferences, and therefore has “little incentive to
collect new policy information and to explore counter proposals.
If the majority deviates from its long-held policy positions, it
74
risks harming its brand and alienating its core supporters.”
The takeaway is simple. Seidman claims that
constitutionalism is harmful for democratic discourse. But
although this observation may be correct, it may also be of
relatively little import. Politicians have discursive and
institutional tools at their disposal to limit democratic debate.
They make non-falsifiable claims in matters of high saliency and
they can rely on internal legislative rules to bypass all things
considered judgments. Indeed, the filibuster, one of the more
maligned devices claimed to be responsible for the current
political gridlock, is a consequence of Senate rules that can be
changed with an ordinary majority. These and other debate
limiting strategies are not grounded in the Constitution. They
would be available even if the Constitution was ignored, and
they can be changed independently of the Constitution. On this
view, constitutionalism is a rhetorical strategy, among many
others. Does it add to the politician’s toolkit? No doubt. Does it
add to it in a way that is quantitatively and qualitatively
significant? Of that I am less sure.
Up until now, I have argued that the host of factors
affecting political debate makes it difficult to assess the relative
71. William Claus Bendix, One Party Deliberations in the U.S. House of
Representatives 1 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of British
Columbia) (citing SUNIL AHUJA, CONGRESS BEHAVING BADLY: THE RISE OF
PARTISANSHIP AND INCIVILITY AND THE DEATH OF PUBLIC TRUST 33 (2008)).
72. Id. at 2
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4.
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contribution of the Constitution to the denigration of that
discourse. To be clear, I do not think Seidman is wrong to
believe that constitutional talk has harmful consequences, only
that the empirical case for proving this assertion is complicated
and has not been made out as fully as it could have been. Before
concluding, however, we should consider whether the
Constitution also has the capacity to create better discourse and
generate better democratic decisions. If it does, then we must
weigh those benefits against the purported costs.
Much like Seidman’s claim about the harm of constitutional
language, it is difficult to gauge the discursive benefits of having
75
a constitution. Still, it is worth considering what the
Constitution does. A constitution can serve as a “focal point for
an ongoing debate and dialogue, in which all members of society
76
participate.” The emphasis here is on the words “ongoing” and
“all members.” Just as constitutional talk can be exclusive and
absolutist, so too can it be inclusive and relative, and mediate all
things considered decisions. As Joseph Raz argued in the context
of individual rights:
Assertions of rights are typically intermediate conclusions
in arguments from ultimate values to duties . . . . The fact
that practical arguments proceed through the mediation of
intermediate stages so that not every time a practical
question arises does one refer to ultimate values for an
answer is . . . of crucial importance in making social life
possible, not only because it saves time and tediousness,
but primarily because it enables a common culture to be
formed round shared intermediate conclusions, in spite of a
great degree of haziness and disagreement concerning
77
ultimate values.

Indeed, in an earlier book Seidman himself made a similar claim
when he defended judicial review on the grounds that it has the

75. Seidman essentially admits this. Recall that he argues that the Constitution does
not necessarily protect freedom. Yet the use of the word “necessarily” implies that the
case for a definitive determination is complicated. Seidman references many cases where
the Court protected freedom only when the public supported it, but the counterargument
to that is that such cases can later serve the Court in instances where the public is more
ambivalent.
76. Barak Medina, “Foundational” Originalism? On Jack Balkin’s Living
Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
77. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181 (1986), cited in Medina, supra
note 76, at 13 n.64. For a similar point, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).

3 - THE END OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW_SHINAR (DO NOT DELETE)

208

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

2/21/2014 11:56 AM

[Vol. 29:181

capacity to unsettle outcomes produced by the political process.78
In that book, he argued that constitutional law can help build a
community not by settling political disputes, but by creating
them. Losers have no reason to abide by political settlements
they deeply oppose, he wrote, “[b]ut a constitution that unsettles
79
creates no permanent losers.” On that view, constitutional
language is the opposite of exclusivity and absolutism. It
provides a semantic framework that, precisely because of its
haziness, destabilizes political conflict and keeps everyone
engaged in the same enterprise.
Of course, according to Seidman we can (and should) use
constitutional language without giving it constitutional force.
The Constitution will be available, but its power will be limited
to that of a poem, as a symbolic expression of our commitments,
much in the same way we use the Declaration of Independence
as a rhetorical device. The problem is that if the Constitution
were a poem it would not be as powerful a focal point. It would
not be able to perform the unsettlement function and it would
80
lose much of its symbolic capital. To be sure, this is exactly
what Seidman is driving at, yet alongside the discursive benefits
of such a move, there may also be discursive costs—costs that
even Seidman used to believe existed—that should be taken into
account.
A constitution can be viewed pessimistically, as introducing
brakes on popular self-government, or optimistically, as
introducing devices that may activate and energize better
democratic government by making officials and society more
81
focused about everyone’s rights and interests. A constitution
can mobilize social movements, both symbolically and
substantively, but it may also limit social change, because of the
narrow, and often conservative, legal frame it necessarily adopts
78. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW
DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
79. Id. at 8.
80. Ackerman, supra note 38, at 779 (discussing the symbolic capital of constitutions). Historically, the legal status of the Constitution was essential for signaling to
the rest of the world that the United States should be admitted to the community of
civilized states, and constitution making was key to realizing that goal. See David M.
Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution,
the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932
(2010).
81. Works in game theory and economics, for example, seek to show how
institutional constraints can increase the capacity of government by making it more
credible to others, both domestically and internationally. See Ferejohn, supra note 35, at
22–24, 25 n.19 (citing studies).
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in order to succeed in the courts. 82 Constitutional law is thus both
transformational and limiting. Both of these strands exist in
American constitutional history. Both have proved correct in
different times, and it is not clear which has the better
83
argument. In the end, Seidman is right to argue that even under
the optimistic view of constitutionalism there is no political
obligation to obey. But there may be good reasons why we
would want a constitution. Those reasons will likely be
instrumentalist and depend on the particular constitutional
design and its likely effects in a particular society. Although
explicating all the reasons goes beyond the scope of this review,
they should nevertheless inform our decision whether to discard
the Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Louis Michael Seidman has written a deep, probing, and
fascinating book on the nature of constitutional obligation. His
diagnosis that American constitutionalism is gravely ill is highly
persuasive. His argument that there is no moral obligation to
obey the Constitution is, to my mind, convincing. It does not
follow, however, that constitutionalism as an idea must be
discarded. To borrow a line from his former book, the fact that
there are problems with constitutional theories does not mean
84
we should get rid of constitutional theory. There may be good
reasons to obey a constitution even if there is no political
obligation to do so. One may wish to emulate, as Seidman does,
countries that do not impose higher law constraints on ordinary
politics, but then one should also keep in mind that such systems
have costs of their own. No political system is perfect, nor can it
be. The questions are what are the costs and benefits and the
tradeoffs that are involved. Those are questions Seidman does
not answer, though he nevertheless opens the conversation for
such an inquiry.

82. Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111
MICH. L. REV. 877, 894 (2013).
83. For an optimistic account about the interaction of judicial review and civil
society, see CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).
84. SEIDMAN, supra note 78, at 7.

